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TIME: Almanac 1990
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1990 Time Magazine Compact Almanac, The (1991)(Time).iso
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032089
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03208900.030
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1990-09-17
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WORLD, Page 38EL SALVADORRevolt Under the Coconut PalmsF.M.L.N. rebels prepare for their boldest assault since 1981By Ricardo Chavira
El Salvador's Santa Ana volcano juts majestically over a
verdant carpet of coffee bushes, coconut palms and banana trees,
and the occasional clump of peasant shacks. Nine years of civil war
have racked vast portions of the country, but Santa Ana and the
rest of western El Salvador have hardly been touched.
Now all that is changing.
Hidden beneath the foliage, several hundred guerrillas of the
People's Revolutionary Army (E.R.P.), the strongest of five
factions that make up the 10,000-member Farabundo Marti National
Liberation Front, have begun battling government forces for control
of the economically vital region. "Cirilo," the western regional
commander of the E.R.P., explains, "Our interest is to lead the
people toward insurrection. They are already clandestinely
organized, and now we are moving to arm them."
Cirilo is with a group of some 30 heavily armed fighters camped
on a coffee plantation just seven miles from Santa Ana's provincial
capital, the site of a major army base. In recent months E.R.P.
regulars and dozens of new peasant militias have attacked military
outposts, ambushed patrols, and even briefly taken a town near the
Guatemalan border.
The guerrillas' bold entry into the region, together with a
sudden surge in F.M.L.N. urban violence, is a graphic demonstration
of what even the Bush Administration privately acknowledges is the
F.M.L.N.'s improved military prowess. Despite the infusion of $3.4
billion in American aid over the past eight years, the Salvadoran
government is not even close to winning the civil war. Troops
killed most of the guerrilla leaders in the west eight years ago,
forcing the F.M.L.N. out of the area. The rebels' return
underscores their new strength and the army's inability to vanquish
them permanently.
The F.M.L.N.'s military aggressiveness contrasts sharply with
the peaceful image the rebels have projected in recent weeks.
F.M.L.N. leaders surprised American and Salvadoran officials in
January with a dramatic offer to lay down their weapons and
participate in national elections. In exchange, the rebels wanted
the March presidential vote postponed for six months. That offer
set off a flurry of counterproposals and talks between the F.M.L.N.
and political-party representatives. State Department officials,
who quietly met with a rebel spokesman to discuss the initiative,
were so intrigued that they encouraged the Salvadoran government
to negotiate with the guerrillas. For a time it seemed as though
the rebel plan could provide a way out of the war.
But like past attempts to bargain, the F.M.L.N. proposal fell
victim to intransigence and political shortsightedness, as
Salvador's civilian and military leaders squabbled over whether,
how and when to include the guerrillas in the electoral process.
There is little doubt now that the election will be held as
scheduled -- March 19 -- without rebel participation.
Stung by their diplomatic setback, the guerrillas are prepared
to unleash what even Bush Administration officials believe will be
their boldest military assault since the failed 1981 "final
offensive." U.S. intelligence officials say the F.M.L.N., in
preparation for the push, has recruited several hundred new
fighters from among refugees in Honduran camps. The officials
expect the offensive within weeks.
The guerrillas sound determined to fight unless a newly elected
government proves unexpectedly willing to reopen negotiations.
Warns Cirilo: "We have a genuine desire for peace. But that should
not be mistaken for weakness." Schafik Jorge Handal, head of the
Salvadoran Communist Party and one of the F.M.L.N.'s top five
comandantes, agrees. "If the military says no to our plan, then
that indicates their intention of defeating us militarily," he
says. "That would oblige us to respond, and the product would be
a deepening of the war." Roberto, a veteran E.R.P. combatant is
more direct: "If the elections are held March 19, our plan is to
block them. This is a war to the finish between us and the
oligarchs."
Far to the east of Santa Ana, in Usulutan province, the E.R.P.
has consolidated its hold on another mountainous corridor,
populated by nearly 200,000 peasants. Three years ago, the
insurgents there were under frequent military attack. Civilian
support was minimal. Today government troops dare only sporadic
attacks, and they are frequently beaten back by peasant militias
fighting alongside regular combatants. "We have established
political control over the area," says "Raul," the rebel commander,
"and now we are moving toward military control as well." He and
other guerrilla leaders have lately obtained AK-47 assault rifles.
They say the guns were bought from the Nicaraguan contras; U.S. and
Salvadoran authorities insist that the Sandinistas supplied them.
"The fact that we have these weapons is an indication of our
development," says Raul.
Peasant support is crucial to the kind of rural-based war the
F.M.L.N. is fighting. The impoverished farmers of Usulutan, for
example, supply the rebels with food, information and labor. Says
a civilian supporter in Santa Ana: "The moment a soldier asks you
the whereabouts of the guerrillas, and you lie and say you don't
know, from that moment you are collaborating with the guerrillas.
And there are thousands of us like that."
The coming guerrilla offensive seems likely to prove a pivotal
test of the government's military strength. U.S. officials doubt
that the F.M.L.N. can inflict a major defeat. But a senior State
Department official adds, "However real or illusory the chances for
peace, they are now gone. Now the only alternative for El Salvador
is more war." That is the last thing battle-weary Salvadorans want.